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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Following a jury trial, Timothy Isiah Jones was convicted of one count of trafficking in
heroin and one count of misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia.
Mr. Jones asserts the district court erred by admitting evidence at trial that he was on
probation and searched pursuant to a Fourth Amendment waiver. Mr. Jones also asserts that the
district court erred in admitting a knife officers found in the front pocket of Mr. Jones’ pants
when they frisked him. He received a unified sentence of thirty years, with fifteen years fixed.
Mr. Jones contends that his sentence represents an abuse of the district court’s discretion, as it is
excessive given any view of the facts.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
On April 25, 2017, law enforcement was conducting surveillance on a trailer home for
wanted persons and possible drug activity. (2/20/18 Tr.,1 p.134, L.6 – p.136, L.12; p.137, L.21 –
p.138, L.3.) After moving into a new surveillance position, one officer saw a Volvo station
wagon, parked but with the engine running, in front of the trailer. (2/20/18 Tr., p.138, L.25 –
p.139, L.6.) A white man was seated in the passenger seat of the running Volvo.2 (2/20/18
Tr., p.143, L.15 – p.145, L.10; p.166, Ls.4-25.) A black man, later identified as Timothy Jones,
came back to the Volvo, rummaged around under the driver’s seat, then went back into the house
empty-handed. (2/20/18 Tr., p.143, L.23 – p.144, L.18; p.157, Ls.10-21.) A few minutes later,
Mr. Jones called to his passenger from the trailer. (2/20/18 Tr., p.144, L.19 – p.145, L.4.) The

1

Because there are multiple volumes of transcripts of trial proceedings in this case, for ease of
reference, citations made herein to the transcripts for the trial and sentencing proceedings in this
case are referred to herein by the date the proceedings took place.
1

passenger went into the trailer momentarily, then returned to the Volvo to rummage under the
driver’s seat, this time producing what the officer believed to be a small black scale, which the
passenger brought into the trailer with him. (2/20/18 Tr., p.144, L.19 – p.146, L.13.) The two
individuals left the trailer shortly thereafter. (2/20/18 Tr., p.148, Ls.22-25.) Officers followed
the vehicle away from the trailer home, and eventually conducted a traffic stop after one officer
observed Mr. Jones was speeding. (2/20/18 Tr., p.149, L.18 – p.152, L.17.) However, at the
outset of the encounter, the officers abandoned the traffic violation basis for the stop, and
investigated Mr. Jones for illegal drugs. (2/20/18 Tr., p.151, Ls.5-15; p.161, Ls.5-25.) Although
Mr. Jones repeatedly asked the officers why he was being stopped and then handcuffed, the
officers did not answer his questions, simply handcuffing and searching him while ignoring his
questions. (State’s Trial Exhs. 3, 5.)
A drug detection police dog was present at the stop and, when the dog was run around the
car, it alerted. (2/20/18 Tr., p.26, Ls.5-19.) After a search of the car, a scale and a small piece of
tinfoil containing a small amount of what appeared to be heroin was located in the console area
in between the passenger seat and the driver’s seat, but closest to the passenger seat. (2/20/18
Tr., p.24, Ls.13-23.)

Upon learning that Mr. Jones was on probation, officers contacted a

supervisor at probation and parole and obtained permission to do a search of Mr. Jones’ person,
pursuant to his waiver of his Fourth Amendment rights.3 (2/20/18 Tr., p.158, L.13 – p.159, L.8;
PSI, p.217.) When searching Mr. Jones, police put their hands in Mr. Jones’ underwear, and
located a bag containing a substance that tested presumptively positive for heroin. (2/20/18

2

Although officers repeatedly referred to the car as a “blue Volvo,” the car’s registration
indicates it is a black Volvo. (PSI, p.212.)
3
The person who gave the officers permission was not Mr. Jones’ probation officer. (2/20/18
Tr., p.158, L.13 – p.159, L.4; PSI, p.16.)
2

Tr., p.159, Ls.9-20.) The substance weighed 30.96 grams. (2/21/18 Tr., p.305, Ls.5-10; PSI,
p.208.)
Based on these facts, the State filed an Information alleging Mr. Jones committed the
crimes of trafficking in heroin and possession of drug paraphernalia. (R., pp.31-32.) Thereafter,
Mr. Jones filed a Motion to Suppress and a Memorandum and Affidavit in Support. (R., pp.7690.) He asserted the evidence should be suppressed on several bases, including that the initial
purpose of the stop was pretextual and/or was abandoned to pursue a narcotics investigation.
(R., pp.83-84, 129-30.)

Mr. Jones also asserted that he was detained without reasonable,

articulable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing, and that his detention was unlawfully prolonged to
allow law enforcement additional time to further investigate, including: 1) using a drug dog, 2)
searching Mr. Jones’ car, and 3) determining that Mr. Jones was on probation and then
contacting the probation department. (R., pp.84-86, 130-32.)

After the hearing, the district

court denied the motion to suppress—concluding that the officers had reasonable articulable
suspicion that Mr. Jones was engaging in a drug transaction at the trailer, thus the stop to pursue
a drug investigation was lawful. (R., pp.136, 184-89.)
Before trial, the State advised that it intended to elicit testimony and/or evidence that
Mr. Jones was on probation. (2/20/18 Tr., p.10, L.21 – p.23, L.8.) Over defense counsel’s
objections, the district court ruled that evidence that Mr. Jones was on probation was admissible
because the officers’ invasive search of Mr. Jones’ person must be considered in calculating the
prejudice to the defense. (2/20/18 Tr., p.20, Ls.4-20.) The court determined that the evidence
was not being admitted to prove Mr. Jones’ character or that he acted in conformity therewith,
but was admissible to show “the context of the search.” (2/20/18 Tr., p.22, L.19 – p.23, L.6.)
Later, Mr. Jones objected to the admission of a knife found in his pants pocket when he was

3

frisked. (2/21/18 Tr., p.209, Ls.6-25; State’s Trial Exh. 12.) The district court admitted the
exhibit, finding that the knife was relevant because, “knives are commonly used in drug
transactions,” and that “any unfair prejudice did not outweigh its probative value.” (2/21/18
Tr., p.237, Ls.10-22.)
After the jury trial, Mr. Jones was found guilty as charged. (2/20/18 Tr., p.372, L.17 –
p.373, L.15; R., pp.182-83.) At sentencing, the State recommended a sentence of thirty years,
with sixteen years fixed. (3/16/18 Tr., p.386, L.19 – p.387, L.8.) The defense recommended
fifteen years, fixed, consistent with the statutory mandatory minimum. (3/16/18 Tr., p.389, L.10
- p.390, L.18.) The district court sentenced Mr. Jones to a unified term of thirty years, with
fifteen years fixed. (3/16/18 Tr., p.392, L.23 – p.393, L.7; R., pp.200-04.) Mr. Jones filed a
Notice of Appeal timely from the district court’s judgment of conviction. (R., pp.205-08, 21621.)

4

ISSUES
I.

Did the district court err by admitting I.R.E. 404(b) evidence that Mr. Jones was on
probation?

II.

Did the district court err by admitting the knife into evidence at trial?

III.

Did the district court abuse its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence?

5

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Erred When It Admitted Testimony That Mr. Jones Was On Probation

A.

Introduction
At trial, the jury heard from a State’s witness that Mr. Jones was on probation and had

executed a Fourth Amendment waiver. This evidence was admitted over defense counsel’s
objection that Mr. Jones’ status was irrelevant to whether he possessed a trafficking quantity of
heroin and drug paraphernalia, and further, any probative value was far outweighed by its
prejudice to the defense. The district court allowed the evidence, first ruling that the State might
be prejudiced if this information were not admitted, as the jury may be offended at the invasive
nature of the search conducted on Mr. Jones’ person where the officers stuck their hands in
Mr. Jones’ underwear when they searched his person. Later, the district court analyzed the
evidence under I.R.E. 404(b), and ruled that Mr. Jones’ probationary status was necessary to
show the “context of the search.” Mr. Jones asserts that district court erroneously admitted the
irrelevant propensity evidence, misapplied the I.R.E. 403 determination, and failed to address the
State’s I.R.E. 404(b) notice violation.

B.

Standard Of Review
This Court generally reviews the district court’s decision whether to admit prior bad acts

evidence under I.R.E. 404(b) for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49,
51 (2009). Under I.R.E. 404(b), this Court reviews both whether the evidence admitted was
relevant to a material and disputed issue regarding the crime charged, other than propensity, and
whether the probative value of the evidence is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to

6

the defendant. State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 569 (2007). The district court’s determination as to
whether to admit or to exclude evidence based upon the potential for prejudice of that evidence
under I.R.E. 403 is likewise reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho
664, 667 (2010). In reviewing a trial court’s decision for an abuse of discretion, the relevant
inquiry regards four factors:
Whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2)
acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the
legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached
its decision by the exercise of reason.
Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863 (2018).
However, the relevance of evidence is a question of law and therefore this Court reviews
the district court’s determination that evidence is relevant de novo. State v. Raudebaugh, 124
Idaho 758, 764 (1993). The appellate courts exercise free review over a trial court’s relevance
determination because relevancy is neither a factual issue nor a matter of judicial discretion. See
Id.; State v. Cross, 132 Idaho 667, 670 (1999).
C.

The District Court Erred By Admitting Evidence That Mr. Jones Was On Probation
Because Evidence Of Mr. Jones’ Probationary Status Was Inadmissible Under I.R.E.
404(b)
“Under I.R.E. 404(b), evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to show

a defendant’s criminal propensity.” Johnson, 148 Idaho at 667. Such evidence may, however,
be admissible for a non-propensity or character purpose so long as the prosecution provides
timely notice of its intent to use such evidence. Id.
To determine the admissibility of evidence of prior bad acts, the Idaho Supreme Court
had adopted a two-tiered test. The first tier involves a two-part inquiry as to whether: (1) there
is sufficient evidence to establish the prior bad act as fact; and (2) the prior bad act is relevant to
a material disputed issue concerning the crime charged, excepting propensity. Grist, 147 Idaho
7

at 52; State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 667 (2010). The second tier of the I.R.E. 404(b) analysis
is a determination under I.R.E. 403 regarding whether the probative value of the evidence is
substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. Johnson, 148 Idaho at 667; Grist, 147 Idaho at 52.
Evidence of uncharged misconduct must be relevant to a material and disputed issue
concerning the crime charged, other than propensity. The State not only had to show that an
I.R.E 404(b) exception applied, but it also had to show that the evidence is relevant under I.R.E.
401, and that its probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly
presenting cumulative evidence, consistent with I.R.E. 403. This it did not do.
The prosecutor argued, “the State too is entitled to a fair trial, and to withhold evidence
that could be prejudicial to the State is something the Court can consider as it relates to the
relevance of a portion of the evidence.” (2/20/18 Tr., p.17, Ls.21-24.) The State claimed that
Mr. Jones’ probation status was relevant because that is why his person, including his underwear,
was searched by the police. (2/20/18 Tr., p.16, Ls.2-19.) The State claimed that, should the jury
believe the police officers searched the defendant inside his pants for no reason, the State would
be prejudiced. (2/20/18 Tr., p.16, Ls.20-25.) The district court clarified, that I.R.E. 403 does not
take into consideration the prejudice to the State; however, the court ultimately agreed with the
prosecutor that withholding evidence relating to the invasive search would be prejudicial to the
State, and it ruled that is a consideration in the magnitude of the unfairness to the defense.
(2/20/18 Tr., p.17, Ls.20-24; p.18, Ls.18-23; p.20, Ls.4-20.)

8

1.

Mr. Jones’ Status As A Probationer Is Irrelevant To The Issue Of Whether
Mr. Jones Possessed Drug Paraphernalia Or Heroin

Mr. Jones asserts that his probationary status was not relevant. Testimony regarding
Mr. Jones’ probationary status does not make any material fact to the charged offenses “more or
less probable.” I.R.E. 401. “Generally, character evidence is not permissible to prove a person
acted in conformity therewith.” State v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584, 591 (2013) (citing I.R.E.
404(a)). Testimony that Mr. Jones was currently on probation was nothing more than
impermissible propensity evidence to show the jury that Mr. Jones had previously been
convicted of criminal actions, which implicitly asked the jury to impermissibly conclude that it
was more likely that Mr. Jones had again broken the law.
Evidence is admissible if is “relevant to a material and disputed issue concerning the
crime charged.” Field, 144 Idaho at 569.

Relevant evidence means evidence having the

tendency to make the existence of a fact of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. I.R.E. 401. To determine
whether a fact is material, the reviewing court examines its relationship to the legal theories
presented by the parties. State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 443 (2008). All relevant evidence is
admissible except as otherwise provided by the rules of evidence or other applicable rules.
I.R.E. 402.
The district court concluded that the evidence was relevant under I.R.E. 401, where it
“does have a tendency to make any fact more likely or not.” (2/20/18 Tr., p.20, Ls.4-7.)
However, this is not the legal standard for relevance. The district court erred in its analysis as
the evidence did not have any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence
to the determination of the action more probable or less probable. See I.R.E. 401 (emphasis
added).

9

Whether Mr. Jones was on probation, and whether the terms of his probation included a
Fourth Amendment waiver was relevant only to the lawfulness of the search of his person, which
was not at issue in the trial. (See 2/20/18 Tr., p.13, L.2 – p.15, L.18.) The issue at trial was
whether Mr. Jones possessed a trafficking amount of heroin and drug paraphernalia. There was
no need for the jury to know that Mr. Jones was so thoroughly searched because he was on
probation and had waived his Fourth Amendment rights. Thus, it follows that the only purpose
for offering the probation information to the jury was to show Mr. Jones’ bad character or his
propensity to commit unlawful acts. This was impermissible. Mr. Jones contends the district
court erred by admitting evidence that he was on probation.

2.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Admitting Evidence That Mr. Jones
Was On Probation Where The Potential Prejudice Of This Evidence To Mr. Jones
Substantially Outweighed Any Probative Value Of The Evidence

After the district court concluded that the evidence was relevant, the district court then
determined that evidence or testimony regarding Mr. Jones’ probation status was not more
prejudicial than probative because the State wanted to explain why the officers stuck their hands
in Mr. Jones’ underwear:
I believe it is admissible under 401 – actually, it’s relevant under 401, that does
have a tendency to make any fact more likely or not. The question under 403 and
whether or not I believe it’s prejudice to Mr. Chastain. The question is it unfair
prejudice and the question is does the unfair prejudice substantially outweigh the
probative value.
The underlying issue is it’s a probation. The allegation here – there is no way for
a jury to know how long ago it is, what the crime is. A lot of people have
probation, a large number of people in America can be on probation and it can be
for a completely unrelated fact, and I think Ms. Reilly argument is well-taken you
have to have a two-part search, some invasiveness and that is a fact to be
considered in the magnitude of what the unfairnesses [sic] to Mr. Chastain’s case.
So I’ll allow it.

10

(2/20/18 Tr., p.20, Ls.4-21.) In so ruling, the court considered both the talk of probation made
during the traffic stop as well as the discussion of probation by Mr. Jones during his videotaped
interview. (2/20/18 Tr., p.22, L.19 – p.23, L.8.)

a.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Considering The Prejudice
To The State In Evaluating The Admissibility Of The Evidence Under
I.R.E. 403

Mr. Jones asserts that the district court, by relying on the State’s argument that the jurors
might be appalled at the invasive nature of the search into Mr. Jones’ underwear if they were not
made aware of his probation status and Fourth Amendment waiver, failed to act in accordance
with applicable legal standards in analyzing whether the evidence was more probative than
prejudicial. The court apparently concluded that excluding the information would be harmful to
the State’s image due to the invasive nature of the search; however, this is not the appropriate
analysis—the proper analysis is whether the probative value of the evidence outweighs any
prejudice to the defendant. See State v. Sheldon, 145 Idaho 225, 229 (2008).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held:
To determine the admissibility of evidence of prior uncharged misconduct, a trial
court must engage in a two-tiered analysis, inquiring (1) whether the evidence is
relevant to an issue other than character, guilt, or propensity, and (2) whether
under I.R.E. 403 the probative value of that evidence is substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant.
State v. Cross, 132 Idaho 667, 670 (1999) (internal citation omitted) (emphasis added). The
analysis requiring the probative value of the evidence to be weighed against the prejudice to the
defendant is set forth in I.R.E. 403, adopted in 1985; however, the rule of evidence simply
codified then-existing common law. See State v. Sharp, 101 Idaho 498, 501-502 (1980) (holding
“the probative value of the evidence linking the defendant to the commission of the crime is to

11

be weighed against the prejudice to the defendant”). The district court’s concern for prejudice to
the State was misplaced.

b.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Concluding That The
Probative Value Of The Evidence That Mr. Jones Was On Probation
Outweighed The Prejudice To The Defense

Mr. Jones asserts that the district court’s admission of evidence that he was on probation
was error because the prejudice of this evidence substantially outweighed any probative value.
See I.R.E. 403.
“As with the admissibility of any piece of evidence, where the probative value of the
statement[s] is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice . . . this evidence
should be excluded.” State v. Goodrich, 97 Idaho 472, 477 (1976). This requires an analysis of
whether the testimony should have been excluded under Idaho Rule of Evidence 403, which
allows for the exclusion of relevant evidence “if its probative value is substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice.” See I.R.E. 403. Under I.R.E. 403, relevant evidence can be
excluded by the district court if, inter alia, the probative value of that evidence is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, danger of misleading the
jury, or if the evidence would involve needless presentation of cumulative evidence. State v.
Tapia, 127 Idaho 249, 254 (1995). “The trial judge, in determining probative worth, focuses
upon the degree of relevance and materiality of the evidence and the need for it on the issue on
which it is to be introduced.” Davidson v. Beco Corp., 114 Idaho 107, 110 (1987). To some
extent, all probative evidence is prejudicial. State v. Gauna, 117 Idaho 83, 88 (Ct. App. 1989).
The question is whether that prejudice is unfair; whether it harms the defendant because it is so
inflammatory that it would lead the jury to convict regardless of other facts presented. Id. This
inquiry does not center on “whether the evidence is harmful to the strategy of the party opposing
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its introduction,” but on whether the evidence “invites inordinate appeal to lines of reasoning
outside the evidence or emotion which are irrelevant to the decision making process.” State v.
Rhoades, 119 Idaho 594, 604 (1991).
The district court erred in admitting the testimony.

As discussed in Section a, the

evidence was not relevant to whether Mr. Jones possessed a trafficking amount of heroin and
drug paraphernalia. Further, should this Court finds it was relevant, any minimally probative
value was substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice. See I.R.E. 401, 402 & 403.
Evidence that Mr. Jones was on probation and had executed a Fourth Amendment waiver
had no probative value as to whether Mr. Jones possessed heroin or drug paraphernalia. As such,
the evidence served only to allow the prosecution to portray Mr. Jones as a criminal. Thus,
admission of this evidence tended to work great prejudice on Mr. Jones’ case, as this evidence
necessarily would tend to imply that he had a propensity to commit criminal offenses like the
ones charged in this case. Accordingly, the evidence was exceptionally and unfairly prejudicial
(as well as irrelevant to whether Mr. Jones committed the charged act), and it is clear that the
district court abused its discretion by failing to act consistently with the legal standards
applicable to the specific choices before it and by failing to reach its decision by an exercise in
reason.

c.

The “Context of the Search” Is Not An Exception To The I.R.E. 404(b)
Exclusion Of Propensity Evidence

Although the district court initially made its decision absent analysis of the evidence as
I.R.E. 404(b) evidence of propensity or prior bad acts, it addressed I.R.E. 404(b) after it had
some time to do additional research. (2/20/18 Tr., p.22, Ls.5-11.) After a break in the trial, the
district court further elaborated on its reasoning:

13

We analyzed [the probation] under 401 and 403, and under 404, as additional part
of the analysis, 404(b), evidence of other crimes. It’s arguable that mentioning
probation is evidence of the crimes, there has to have been another crime
previously done. It’s not admissible to prove the character of a person, to show
the person acted in conformity therewith. That’s not what is being done here, it’s
to being admitted for that purpose. I think the State’s argument is correct it’s just
to show the context of the search, and therefore under 404B(2) [sic], it’s also
under my discretion and I’ll allow it.
(2/20/18 Tr., p.22, L.20 – p.23, L.6.) However, the “context of the search” is simply another
way of saying “res gestae,” a theory of admissibility which was recently rejected by the Idaho
Supreme Court in State v. Kralovec, 161 Idaho 569, 573-74 (2017).
The Kralovec Court described the district court’s definition of res gestae as “sound”:
Res gestae evidence is other acts that occur during the commission of or in close
temporal proximity to the charged offense which must be described to complete
the story of the crime on trial by placing it in the context of nearby and nearly
contemporaneous happenings. It is admissible, despite I.R.E. 404(b)’s general
prohibition on prior bad act evidence, if the charged act and the uncharged act are
so inseparably connected that the jury cannot be given a rational and complete
presentation of the alleged crime without reference to the uncharged misconduct.
Id. 161 Idaho at 573 (internal citations and quotations omitted). However, the Idaho Supreme
Court “decline[d] to perpetuate the use of the res gestae doctrine in Idaho,” concluding that
“evidence previously considered admissible as res gestae is only admissible if it meets the
criteria established by the Idaho Rules of Evidence.” Kralovec, 161 Idaho at 573-74.
After the officer testified about Mr. Jones’ probationary status and Fourth Amendment
waiver, the district court instructed the jury that the fact that Mr. Jones was on probation was
“being admitted for, among other things, so you can understand the circumstances surrounding
the stop.” (2/20/18 Tr., p.162, Ls.6-12.) That is, the jury was instructed that it was not to
consider the probation information “as . . . probative of whether or not Mr. Jones has committed
any crimes here in the trial here before you” but that “it [was] only for understanding the
circumstances of the stop.” (2/20/18 Tr., p.162, Ls.13-20.) However, this cautionary instruction
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was insufficient to cure the harm of admitting prohibited propensity evidence. The jury did not
need additional information regarding “the circumstances of the stop” to determine whether
Mr. Jones possessed a trafficking amount of heroin.
In this case, the propensity evidence proffered by the State of Mr. Jones’ bad acts lacked
relevance and was more prejudicial than probative.

d.

The State Failed To Provide Timely Notice Of Its Intent To Use I.R.E.
404(b) Propensity Evidence

Under I.R.E. 404(b), the State may be able to introduce other-acts evidence against a
defendant if, inter alia, the State files and serves notice of its intent to introduce such evidence
reasonably in advance of trial, or during trial if the district court excuses the lack of such notice
upon a showing of good cause for the failure to provide such notice. I.R.E. 404(b).
The Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Sheldon addressed the practical consequences for
the State’s failure to provide timely notice of its intent to introduce prior bad acts evidence at
trial. 145 Idaho 225 (2008). In Sheldon, the State elicited evidence at trial regarding allegations
that the defendant had made statements admitting that he had previously engaged in drug sales.
Id. at 227. In reviewing whether the admission of the prior bad acts evidence was error in light
of the State’s failure to file timely notice of this evidence, the Sheldon Court held that
compliance with the notice requirement of I.R.E. 404(b) is mandatory. Id. at 230-31. The
Sheldon Court further concluded that, because the State failed to comply with the notice
provisions contained in I.R.E. 404(b), the State’s prior bad acts evidence was inadmissible. Id.
As the introduction of this evidence was highly prejudicial to the defendant, and because such
evidence also likely caught defense counsel off-guard when the district court permitted its
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introduction, the Sheldon Court vacated the defendant’s conviction for trafficking in
methamphetamine. Id.
This Court should do the same. The district court did not make any findings on the
record, including whether there was good cause that would excuse the untimeliness. The State in
this case failed to provide notice of its intent to admit evidence of uncharged acts “reasonably in
advance of trial.” Although the State had provided a copy of the officer’s body-cam video with
its redactions to the defense the Thursday before trial, the State did not file a notice of its intent
to introduce evidence that Mr. Jones was on probation and had executed a waiver. (See 2/20/18
Tr., p.15, Ls.23-25.) The lack of notice deprived Mr. Jones of any ability to defend against these
allegations. In light of this, the district court erred when it admitted the evidence that Mr. Jones
was on probation and had executed a Fourth Amendment waiver.
The district court failed to act consistently with applicable legal standards and within the
proper bounds of its discretion when ruling on the relevance and 404(b) objection. The district
court failed to reach its decision through an exercise of reason, and the admission of the evidence
was erroneous and an abuse of its discretion.

II.
The District Court Erred By Admitting The Knife That Mr. Jones Had In His Pocket As A Trial
Exhibit
A.

Introduction
During trial, defense counsel objected when the State sought to have admitted as a trial

exhibit the knife found in Mr. Jones’ pocket. (2/21/18 Tr., p.209, Ls.6-16.) The district court
overruled the objection, finding the knife was relevant and admissible evidence because, “knives
are commonly used in drug transactions.” (2/21/18 Tr., p.237, Ls.10-22.) Although the district
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court considered it under I.R.E. 403 and found there was prejudice, it nevertheless permitted
testimony and evidence relating to the knife because “any unfair prejudice did not outweigh its
probative value.” (2/21/18 Tr., p.237, Ls.10-17.) Such was error, as the knife was not relevant,
it was more prejudicial than probative of any material fact, and it impermissibly was being used
to inflame the passions or prejudices of the jury by showing Mr. Jones as a dangerous man or a
criminal.

B.

Standard Of Review
The district court’s determination as to whether to admit or to exclude evidence based

upon the potential for prejudice of that evidence under I.R.E. 403 is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 667 (2010). In reviewing a trial court’s decision for
an abuse of discretion, the relevant inquiry regards four factors:
Whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2)
acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the
legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached
its decision by the exercise of reason.
Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863 (2018).
However, the relevance of evidence is a question of law and therefore the appellate court
reviews the district court’s determination that evidence is relevant de novo.

State v.

Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 758, 764 (1993). The appellate court exercises free review over a trial
court’s relevance determination because relevancy is neither a factual issue nor a matter of
judicial discretion. See id.; State v. Cross, 132 Idaho 667, 670 (1999).
C.

The District Court Erred By Admitting The Knife Found In Mr. Jones’ Pocket
Mr. Jones asserts that the district court erred by admitting the knife found in Mr. Jones’

pocket as a trial exhibit, as this evidence should have been excluded as irrelevant and more
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prejudicial than probative. Defense counsel objected to the admission of the knife on the basis
that it would inflame the jury. (2/21/18 Tr., p.237, Ls.10-13.) The court reasoned:
In that regard, knives are commonly used in drug transactions, and it’s relevant to
show that, and therefore it’s also admissible under 401. That was the analysis I
did in my head. I didn’t say that at sidebar.
(2/21/18 Tr., p.237, Ls.18-22.) Although the district court also considered the exhibit under
I.R.E. 403 and found there was prejudice, it nevertheless permitted testimony and evidence
relating to the knife because “any unfair prejudice did not outweigh its probative value.”
(2/21/18 Tr., p.237, Ls.10-17.)
The admission of the knife found in Mr. Jones’ pocket after he was stopped by law
enforcement, did not give any insight as to whether Mr. Jones possessed heroin or drug
paraphernalia; the only purpose in having the evidence admitted would be to inflame the jury by
demonstrating that Mr. Jones was armed and dangerous. In this case, the evidence proffered by
the State lacked relevance and was more prejudicial than probative.

1.

The Knife Found In Mr. Jones’ Pocket Is Irrelevant To The Issue Of Whether
Mr. Jones Possessed Heroin Or Drug Paraphernalia

Mr. Jones asserts the knife found in his pocket was not relevant where it did not make
any material fact to the charged offenses “more or less probable.” I.R.E. 401. The knife did not
give any insight as to whether Mr. Jones possessed a trafficking amount of heroin that day—the
only purpose in having the evidence admitted would be to demonstrate that Mr. Jones was
dangerous because he had a weapon in his possession.
The district court admitted the knife as a trial exhibit over the objection of defense
counsel. In overruling Mr. Jones’ objection, the district court reasoned that the knife was
relevant and admissible because “knives are commonly used in drug transactions.” (2/21/18
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Tr., p.237, Ls.18-22.) The court’s ruling was erroneous, as the presence of a knife does nothing
to establish any material facts in this case. Mr. Jones was charged with trafficking based solely
on the amount of the substance he possessed—there were no charges of delivery, thus, the State
did not have to prove a drug transaction took place.

2.

The District Court Erred In Admitting The Knife Because The Potential Prejudice
Of This Evidence Substantially Outweighed Any Probative Value That The
Evidence May Have Had

Mr. Jones asserts that the district court’s admission at trial of the knife was error because
the prejudice of this evidence substantially outweighed any probative value. The knife was not
relevant to whether Mr. Jones possessed heroin or drug paraphernalia, further, if this Court finds
it was relevant, any minimally probative value was substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair
prejudice. See I.R.E. 401, 402, & 403. Whether evidence is relevant is reviewed de novo, while
trial court “conclusions of whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.”
State v. Page, 135 Idaho 214, 219 (2000).
Although the district court found that the knife was prejudicial, it nevertheless permitted
testimony and evidence relating to the knife because “any unfair prejudice did not outweigh its
probative value.” (2/21/18 Tr., p.237, Ls.10-17.) However, the knife had no probative value as
to whether Mr. Jones possessed heroin or drug paraphernalia. As such, the evidence allowed the
prosecution to better portray him as a violent person or a criminal. Furthermore, such evidence
was admitted solely to inflame the passions and prejudices of the jury—with the hope that they
would be fearful of Mr. Jones because he had such a large, dangerous-looking weapon in his
pocket. (See Aug., p.1.) This was an inflammatory exhibit seemingly calculated to arouse
negative emotions. See State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 87 (Ct. App. 2007) (holding that
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prosecutor’s repeated suggestions that the jurors might feel irritated and upset by the testimony
of the defendant’s girlfriend and brother were improper appeals to the jury’s passion or
prejudice). “[A]ppeals to emotion, passion or prejudice of the jury through use of inflammatory
tactics are impermissible.” Phillips, 144 Idaho at 87. Showing the jury a knife, and then
eliciting testimony from the State’s law enforcement witness that it was “a big knife” and
“[b]igger knife than mine” surely inflamed the jury and caused them to believe Mr. Jones was a
dangerous person. (2/21/18 Tr., p.209, Ls.6-25; p.224, Ls.15-19.) Accordingly, the evidence
was exceptionally and unfairly prejudicial (as well as irrelevant to whether Mr. Jones committed
the charged act), and it is clear that the district court abused its discretion by failing to reach its
decision by an exercise in reason.

III.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Sentenced Mr. Jones To A Unified Sentence
Of Thirty Years, With Fifteen Years Fixed, Following His Trafficking Conviction
Mr. Jones asserts that, given any view of the facts, his unified sentence of thirty years,
with fifteen years fixed, is excessive. Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court
imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review
of the record giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and
the protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982). The
Idaho Supreme Court has held that, “‘[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an appellant
has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court imposing the
sentence.’” State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573,
577 (1979)). In reviewing a trial court’s decision for an abuse of discretion, the relevant inquiry
regards four factors:
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Whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2)
acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the
legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached
its decision by the exercise of reason.
Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863 (2018).
Mr. Jones does not allege that his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. Accordingly,
in order to show the district court abused its discretion by failing to reach its decision by the
exercise of reason, Mr. Jones must show that the sentence was excessive considering any view of
the facts. Id. The governing criteria or objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection of
society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of
rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id.
In light of Mr. Jones’s rehabilitative potential, the district court abused its discretion in
sentencing him excessively. The district court failed to consider the fact that Mr. Jones was
aware of his heroin addiction and that, with programming, Mr. Jones could likely be successful
in the community.
Mr. Jones has considerable support from his family and within the community.
(R., pp.192-98; PSI, pp.230-40; CR-FE-2015-0017214 PSI, p.2.)
Two of Mr. Jones’ uncles wrote letters to the district court regarding Mr. Jones’ strong
family values, his supportive large family, and his abilities as a hard worker and a leader.
(R., pp.190-91.) Marie Roberts, Mr. Jones’ aunt, wrote that Mr. Jones is a smart and wellmannered young man who made a wrong decision, but can still be a productive member of
society. (R., p.198.) Mr. Jones’ parents also wrote to the court with a plea for leniency for their
son, because he is an involved father with a two-year-old son who desperately needs him.
(R., p.193.) Mr. Jones’ sister-in-law wrote to the court that Mr. Jones has a strong bond with his
son, and he is a positive force within the family. (R., p.195.) A parent of Mr. Jones’ former
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classmate wrote that Mr. Jones has great moral character, and is a dependable, responsible, and
respectful person. (R., p.196.) Mr. Jones was described by many members of the community as
a hard worker. (PSI, pp.230, 238.) Other members of the community observed Mr. Jones’
abilities as a loving and caring father. (R., pp.192-93, 197; PSI, pp.230, 238.)
Mr. Jones has a good work history. He was described as a “hard worker,” and he was
employed prior to his incarceration. (CR-FE-2015-0017214 PSI, p.8.) His manager submitted a
letter of recommendation to the court, praising Mr. Jones’s character and job performance. (CRFE-2015-0017214 PSI, p.2.)

Idaho recognizes that good employment history should be

considered a mitigating factor. See State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982); see also State v.
Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that substance abuse should be considered as a
mitigating factor by the district court when that court imposes sentence. State v. Nice, 103 Idaho
89 (1982). In Nice, the Idaho Supreme Court reduced a sentence based on Nice’s lack of prior
record and the fact that “the trial court did not give proper consideration of the defendant’s
alcoholic problem, the part it played in causing the defendant to commit the crime and the
suggested alternatives for treating the problem.” Id. at 91. Additionally, the Idaho Supreme
Court has ruled that ingestion of drugs and alcohol resulting in impaired capacity to appreciate
criminality of conduct, could be a mitigating circumstance. State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 414
(1981). Mr. Jones realizes that he has a heroin addiction. (3/16/18 Tr., p.392, Ls.1-4.)
Further, Mr. Jones expressed remorse for his acts. At sentencing, Mr. Jones told the
district court, “I was a junkie, and I’m paying the maximum penalty for it.” (3/16/18 Tr., p.392,
Ls.1-4.) Idaho recognizes that some leniency is required when a defendant expresses remorse for
his conduct and accepts responsibility for his acts. State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982);
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State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204, 209 (Ct. App. 1991). For example, in Alberts, the Idaho Court of
Appeals noted that some leniency is required when the defendant has expressed “remorse for his
conduct, his recognition of his problem, his willingness to accept treatment and other positive
attributes of his character.” Alberts, 121 Idaho at 209. In Shideler, Idaho Supreme Court ruled
that the prospect of Shideler’s recovery from his poor mental and physical health, which
included mood swings, violent outbursts, and drug abuse, coupled with his remorse for his
actions, was so compelling that it outweighed the gravity of the crimes of armed robbery, assault
with a deadly weapon, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. Shideler,
103 Idaho at 594-95. Therefore, the court reduced Shideler’s sentence from an indeterminate
term not to exceed twenty years to an indeterminate term not to exceed twelve years. Id. at 593.
Mr. Jones’s circumstances are somewhat similar to the facts of both Alberts and Shideler in that
he recognizes that he has an addiction to heroin and he shows remorse for his actions.
Based upon the above mitigating factors, Mr. Jones asserts that the district court abused
its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence upon him. The district court imposed double
the mandatory minimum, despite Mr. Jones’s statements that the amount was for personal use.
(PSI, p.24; State’s Trial Exh.19.) He asserts that had the district court properly considered his
addiction, substantial support within the community, good work history, and remorse, it should
have imposed a less severe sentence.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Jones respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction and
remand his case to the district court for a new trial. Alternatively, he requests that this Court
reduce his sentence or that it remand his case to the district court for a new sentencing hearing.
DATED this 11th day of February, 2019.
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